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NLRB v. TRANSPORTATIONMANAGEMENT
CORP.: ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN
OF PROOF IN SECTION 8(a)(3)
MIXED MOTIVE
DISCHARGE CASES
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.) guarantees
employees the right to self-organization. Section 8 of the Act protects this
right by proscribing in subsection 8(a)(3) discrimination intended to en-
courage or discourage union membership because of activities protected by
section 7.2 Enforcement is authorized in section 10 empowering the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (the Board or the NLRB) to "prevent any
person from engaging in [an] unfair labor practice [listed in section 8(a)(3)]
... If the Board finds by a preponderance of evidence that an em-
ployer has engaged in an unfair labor practice, section 10(c) allows the
Board to order reinstatement of aggrieved employees with or without back
pay.4 A 1947 amendment to section 10(c),5 however, prohibits the Board
from ordering reinstatement of an employee who has been discharged for
cause.
6
1. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) [hereinafter
N.L.R.A.] provides in part: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection .... "
2. N.L.R.A. § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) provides in part: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer . . . ; (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization... ;"
3. N.L.R.A. § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
4. N.L.R.A. § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) provides in part:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion
that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue
and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies
of this Act . ...
5. The amendment was added by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-
Hartley) § 10(c), Pub. L. No. 86-257, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1976)) [hereinafter cited as L.M.R.A.] The L.M.R.A. incorporated the N.L.R.A., see supra
note 1, as title I.
6. L.M.R.A. § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976) also provides: "No order of the Board
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The crux of a section 8(a)(3) violation is finding discriminatory motive.7
This means the NLRB General Counsel must establish a causal nexus be-
tween the employer's decision to discipline or take other adverse action
against an employee, and the employee's protected union activities.8 Often
employers assert legitimate business reasons for employee discipline. If
the NLRB credits the asserted business justification and finds no addi-
tional unlawful motive for the adverse action, the section 8(a)(3) complaint
against the employer will be dismissed.9 Conversely, the NLRB will find a
violation of section 8(a)(3) if it determines that protected union activities
constitute a motive for the adverse action against the employee and dis-
credits the alleged "legitimate" reasons as pretextual " Difficulties arise
when both the employee's claim of unlawful motive and the employer's
asserted business justification are found to be of merit. Courts are split
over the proper treatment of these "mixed motive" cases."1
shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or
discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or
discharged for cause."
7. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 43 (1954) (The motivation of the
employer in proving prohibited discrimination has been consistently recognized.). See gen-
erally F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 15-17
(1977). An unfair labor practice action begins when an employee files a written charge with
the Regional Director in the district in which the violation occurred within the six month
statute of limitations. If a preliminary investigation shows sufficient evidence to substantiate
the charge, the Regional Director issues a complaint and a formal hearing is conducted
before an administrative law judge (ALJ) who prepares findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and a recommended order. If the Board takes no exceptions, it affirms the ALJ's order.
Because Board orders are not self-enforcing, the employee must seek enforcement from a
federal court of appeals if the employer refuses to comply. See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.1-
102.51 (NLRB's administrative regulations); N.L.R.A. § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976)
(Board may petition a court of appeals for enforcement); N.L.R.A. § 10(f), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(f) (1976) (an aggrieved party may seek review by a court of appeals).
8. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1976) ("[T]he finding of a viola-
tion [under § 8(a)(3)] normally turns on whether the discriminatory conduct was motivated
by an antiunion purpose."), (citing American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311
(1965)); see generally Note, Mixed Motive Discharges-An Attempt to Formulate a Consistent
Test-NLRB v. Wright Line, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 328, 336 (1983) ("The ultimate question in a
mixed motive case is whether there is a causal link between any discriminatory motive pos-
sessed by the employer and the discharge.").
9. Essential elements in finding that an employer's adverse action violates § 8(a)(3)
include: (1) employer knowledge that the employee engaged in union activity, see, e.g.,
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 651 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1981); and (2) the existence of a discrimi-
natory motive, see, e.g., NLRB v. Consolidated Diesel Elec. Co., 469 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir.
1972).
10. See, e.g., NLRB v. Nevis Indus., Inc., 647 F.2d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 1981), infra notes
126-137 and accompanying text; Red Ball Motor Freight v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 626 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 997 (1982), infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
11. Compare Behring Int'l v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that the Gen-
eral Counsel must prove absence of legitimate business reasons for the disciplinary action),
[Vol. 33:279
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The NLRB and some federal courts of appeals have held that a prima
facie section 8(a)(3) case has been established once the General Counsel
proves that a motivating reason for the discipline was an employee's pro-
tected section 7 activities. 2 The employer may then avoid liability by
demonstrating, as an affirmative defense, legitimate and sufficient business
reasons for the discharge-that is, that the employee would have been dis-
ciplined absent his participation in protected union activities.' 3
Other courts have held that the General Counsel, in addition to estab-
lishing discriminatory motivation, must also prove that legitimate business
reasons for the employer's disciplinary action are pretextual.14 Courts fol-
lowing this methodology have required the employer to articulate a legiti-
mate business reason for the adverse action, after which the General
Counsel must prove the reason to be insufficient. These courts have ac-
knowledged that this approach is the same as the analysis applied under
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for proving discriminatory intent.15
They reason, however, that section 10(c) of the N.L.R.A. precludes the
Board from shifting to the employer the burden of proving a legitimate
and sufficient business justification.' 6
infra notes 76-114 and accompanying text with NLRB v. Nevis Indus., Inc., 647 F.2d 905
(9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the employer has the opportunity to establish legitimate busi-
ness justification for the disciplinary action as an affirmative defense), infra notes 126-37 and
accompanying text.
12. See Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982) ("[W]e shall require that the General Counsel
make aprimafacie showing sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct was a
'motivating factor' in the employer's decision."); see also Red Ball Motor Freight v. NLRB,
660 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 997 (1982), infra notes 120-25 and accom-
panying text; Zurn Indus. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
3110, (1983), infra notes 138-47.
13. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089 ("Once [the prima facie case] is established, the
burden will shift to the employer to demonstrate that the same action would have taken
place even in the absence of the protected conduct."); see, e.g., Peavey Co. v. NLRB, 648
F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1981) (The employer showed that the employee would have been dis-
charged even in the absence of protected conduct.).
14. See, e.g., Behring Int'l v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1982), infra notes 76-88 and
accompanying text. The court held that a § 8(a)(3) violation may be established if an em-
ployee would not have been discharged "but for" his union activity. Id at 84. This rule
requires the NLRB to prove the "real motive" or "real cause" of the employee's discharge,
id at 87, which necessarily requires the General Counsel to prove that legitimate business
reasons were not the true reasons for the adverse action. Id at 89; see also NLRB v. Webb
Ford, Inc., 689 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1982), infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text; NLRB v.
New York Univ. Medical Center, 702 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1983), infra notes 100-12 and accom-
panying text.
15. See, e.g., Behring, 675 F.2d at 88-89.
16. See id at 88. Federal courts have therefore been divided over the elements of a
§ 8(a)(3) violation. The disagreement stems from whether the N.L.R.A. requires the em-
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In NLRB v. Transportation Management Corporation, 17 the United
States Supreme Court addressed this conflict and affirmed the Board's ap-
proach. The Transportation Management Corporation discharged bus
driver Sam Santillo shortly after he had distributed union authorization
cards. 18 Santillo filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board alleg-
ing a section 8(a)(3) violation. His employer claimed he was discharged
for leaving his keys in the bus and taking unauthorized breaks.' 9 The
Board determined that a comment made by Santillo's supervisor-that he
would "get even" with Santillo for his union activity--established a prima
facie case of discriminatory intent.2" Futhermore, the Board found that
because the employer had not disciplined other employees for similar be-
havior and had violated the company procedure of issuing three written
warnings before discharging an employee, the employer failed to demon-
strate that it would have fired Santillo in the absence of this protected con-
duct.2 ' The Board concluded, therefore, that Transportation
Management Corporation had violated section 8(a)(3) and ordered San-
tillo's reinstatement.22
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied the
Board's enforcement order, holding that the Board had no authority under
the N.L.R.A. to impose on the employer the burden of proving the as-
serted legitimate business justification as an affirmative defense. 23 The
court of appeals reasoned that section 10(c), requiring the Board to find by
a preponderance of evidence that an employer engaged in an unfair labor
practice, prohibits the Board from requiring the employer to prove a legiti-
mate and sufficient business reason for the discharge. 24 The First Circuit
relied on its earlier opinion, NLRB v. Wright Line (Wright Line II) that
repudiated the Board's approach to section 8(a)(3) mixed motive cases. 25
ployer to show that the employee would have been discharged in spite of his union activity,
or whether the General Counsel must prove that the employee would not have been dis-
charged "but for" his protected activities.
17. 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983).
18. Id at 247 1.
19. Id
20. Id at 2472.
21. Id
22. Id
23. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 674 F.2d 130, 131 (1st Cir. 1982),
rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983).
24. 674 F.2d at 132.
25. The Board set forth its § 8(a)(3) analysis in Wright Line, Inc. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Wright Line I], see infra notes 55-72 and accompanying text. An
employee sought enforcement of the Board's order in Wright Line I. The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, although granting enforcement, repudiated the
Board's approach set forth in Wright Line I as being contrary to the provisions of § 10(c) of
[Vol. 33:279
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In Wright Line I, the First Circuit held that the employer's burden was
merely to introduce some evidence of a legitimate business justification in
order to rebut the General Counsel's prima facie case.26 The court rea-
soned that because section 10(c) requires the General Counsel to prove the
existence of a violation by a preponderance of evidence,27 the General
Counsel must prove that the employer's asserted business justification is
pretextual. The First Circuit's view, that under section 10(c) the ultimate
risk of nonpersuasion remains with the General Counsel,28 requires the
General Counsel to prove both the existence of discriminatory intent and
the absence of a legitimate cause for discipline.29 Until the General Coun-
sel proves that the business reason is pretexual, no violation is established.
In the Wright Line II court's view, a true affirmative defense obviates the
existence of a violation that has already been established. The court,
therefore, concluded that the Board had "mislabeled" the employer's bur-
den as an affirmative defense.3"
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, agreed with the First Cir-
cuit that the burden of persuasion remains with the General Counsel to
prove by a preponderance of evidence that antiunion animus motivated
the discharge.3' The Court disagreed, however, with the First Circuit's
contention that the Board erred in requiring the employer to prove a legiti-
mate and sufficient business justification once the NLRB General Counsel
has established a prima facie case.32 By approving the Board's characteri-
the N.L.R.A. because the Board improperly placed the burden of persuasion on the em-
ployer. NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 904 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Wright Line II]. For a discussion of the controversy created by
the Wright Line case, see Lederer, "W"right Line or Spur Track? 22 LAB. L.J. 67 (1982);
Note, supra note 8; Note, The First Circuit Court Adopts a New Burden of Proof Scheme for
Section 8(a)(3) Dual Motive Discharge Actions, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 226 (1982).
26. 662 F.2d at 904.
27. Id
28. Id at 905 n.9.
29. Id at 905.
30. Id at 905 n.9 ("The Board appears to recognize that the general counsel must al-
ways establish the existence of an unfair labor practice by a preponderance of the evidence,
but then confuses the issue by mislabeling the employer's burden as an 'affirmative de-
fense.' "). An affirmative defense is a matter that the defendant may allege to defeat the
plaintiffs claim. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1270
(1969). Procedurally, an affirmative defense places the burden of pleading, production and
persuasion upon the defendant. See id § 1271, at 311-16. The First Circuit maintained that
an affirmative defense addresses only the issue of remedy, see Wright Line 11, 662 F.2d at
906, but it can also be determinative on the issue of liability. See, e.g., Belton, Burdens of
Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases. Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34
VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1250 (1981).
31. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. at 2474.
32. Id
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zation of the employer's burden as an affirmative defense, the Court settles
both the narrower issue of the exact nature of the employer's burden and
the broader issue of the elements of proof the General Counsel must pres-
ent to establish a prima facie case.
This Note will analyze the Transportation Management Corp. decision in
relation to the conflicting interpretations of the N.L.R.A. and the Board's
method of handling mixed motive discharge cases. An examination of the
legislative history of section 10(c) reveals that requiring the employer to
prove legitimate motives once the NLRB General Counsel proves a prima
facie section 8(a)(3) violation comports with legislative intent.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE ALLOCATION OF
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN MIXED MOTIVE CASES
A. The Legislative History of the Controversy
Section 8(a)(3), which defines one of five employer unfair labor practices
enumerated in the N.L.R.A., has remained virtually unchanged since its
promulgation in 1935."3 Significantly, the Act only vaguely describes the
elements of a section 8(a)(3) violation,34 and only obliquely speaks to the
question of burden of proof in section 10(C). 35
Section 10(c) of the Wagner Act initially provided that the Board, if it
33. The L.M.R.A., seesupra note 5, amended § 8(3) in the original N.L.R.A. of 1935 by
adding a proviso prohibiting the "closed shop," an agreement between the employer and
union that the employer will hire only union members; but since 1935 the basic proscription
against discrimination in hiring or tenure of employment has remained unchanged. Com-
pare S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(3) (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935, at 3243-44 (1949) with H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, at 510 (1948) (The prohi-
bition against "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organiza-
tion" went unchanged between the Wagner Act in 1935 and the Taft-Hartley amendments
in 1947.).
34. See Note, Determining a Standard of Causation/or Discriminatory Discharges Under
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 913, 922 (1981)
(Courts have fluctuated regarding the elements and burdens of proof required to establish a
§ 8(a)(3) violation.). Compare 93 CONG. REC. 6678 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, at 1595 (1948) (em-
ployer must prove absence of discrimination) with H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist
Sess. 55 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, at 559 (1948) (General Counsel must prove that unfair labor prac-
tice occurred).
35. N.L.R.A. § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) states in part:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion
that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue
[Vol. 33:279
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found that an employer was committing an unfair labor practice, could
either order the employer to cease and desist or order reinstatement with
or without back pay to effectuate the policies of the Act.36 The 1947 Taft-
Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act readjusted the focus of national
labor policy37 by extending the section 7 rights of employees to include the
right to refrain from concerted activities38 and defining a variety of union
unfair labor practices. In addition, the amendments provided protection
for employers' business interests39 by adding a controversial provision to
section 10(c) which prohibited the Board from requiring reinstatement of
an employee who had been suspended or discharged for cause.4° In a
Senate floor debate prior to passage of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, Senator
Taft and Senator Pepper debated whether the "for cause" proviso to sec-
tion 10(c) placed the burden on the employer to prove the existence of
legitimate justification for employee discipline or on the General Counsel
to prove the absence of legitimate cause.41 Unfortunately, the colloquy is
subject to differing reasonable interpretations. 42 The lack of clear gui-
dance from the statute or its legislative history has created a controversy
and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from such unfair labor practice ....
Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id. See supra note 4.
37. See R. Hartley, The Framework of Democracy in Union Government, 32 CATH. U.L.
REV. 13, 45-48 (1982).
38. See N.L.R.A. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
39. See Hartley, supra note 37, at 45-48. Following the enactment of the Wagner Act,
unions prospered, tripling in size between 1933 and 1941. Employer groups met the growth
of unionism with strong opposition both in the form of noncompliance with the Wagner Act
at the workplace and political opposition in Congress. Arguments that legislation was re-
quired to limit the power of unions culminated in a Congressional override of a Presidential
veto of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act. See supra note 5. The
amendments placed a concomitant duty of restraint on unions to recognize the legitimate
but conflicting interests of the employer by enacting prohibitions on various union unfair
labor practices. However, the amendments also reaffirmed the employees' right to self-or-
ganization and sought to effectuate this right by protecting the process of collective bargain-
ing by leaving the prohibitions against employer unfair labor practices virtually unchanged.
40. See supra note 6.
41. See 93 CONG. REC. 6678 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MANGEMENT RELATIONS ACT of 1947, 1593-95 (1948). In the colloquy during
the conference debate between Senator Taft, who supported the amendment to § 10(c), and
Senator Pepper, who opposed the amendment, Pepper argued that the conference version of
the bill placed the burden of proving that an employee was not discharged for cause on the
General Counsel. Taft argued that the conference version left the burden of proving legiti-
mate cause on the employer where, according to Taft, it had always been. At best, this
portion of the legislative history appears inconclusive, and its ambiguity contributed in part
to the current controversy concerning the burden of proof in § 8(a)(3) dual-motive cases.
42. See infra note 109 and accompanying text for further discussion of the legislative
history of the "for cause" proviso.
1983]
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over the proper elements and allocation of the burden of proof in section
8(a)(3) mixed-motive cases.43
B. The Case Law History of the Current Controversy
L The NLRB's In-Part Test
Long before conffict over the proper allocation of the burden of proof
arose within the appellate courts, the issue of the proper standard of causa-
tion to apply in mixed motive section 8(a)(3) cases produced a bitter con-
troversy between the Board and the courts." Prior to Wright Line I, in
which the Board set forth its current methodology for analyzing mixed
motive section 8(a)(3) cases, the Board used an "in-part" causation stan-
dard.45 Under this standard, if antiunion animus contributed in any part
to the employee's discharge, the employer was found to have violated the
N.L.R.A., even though the employer may have possessed a legitimate rea-
son for the discharge.46
Although some appellate courts endorsed and applied the Board's "in-
part" causation standard,47 other courts found the test in conffict with the
employer's section 10(c) right to discharge an employee for cause.48 They
43. For discussion of how the controversy arose, see Lederer, supra note 25; Note, supra
note 8; Note, supra note 25.
44. See generally Lewis & Fisher, Wright Line-An End to the Kaleidoscope in Dual Mo-
tive Cases? 48 TENN. L. REV. 879 (1981) (The courts were divided over the amount of
evidence of antiunion motive necessary for the Board to find a § 8(a)(3) violation.).
45. See Lewis & Fisher, supra note 44, at 882-84.
46. See, e.g., P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 713 (1977); Erie Sand Steamship Co., 189
N.L.R.B. 63 (1971); Tursair Fueling, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 270 (1965).
Although the words used to express the "in-part" test varied, the Board asserted that the
underlying concept remained intact. Wright Line 1, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980), en-
forced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981). See, e.g., Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 224
N.L.R.B. at 574 (1976) ("Under Board precedent if part of the reason for terminating an
employee is unlawful, the discharge violates the Act."), enforced in part, 574 F.2d 891 (6th
Cir. 1978); O&H Restaurant, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 1082, 1083 (1977) ("[T]he decision to termi-
nate [the employee] was based in substantial part on [the employee's] support for the
Union").
47. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gogin, 575 F.2d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 1978), enforcing 229 N.L.R.B.
529 (1977); NLRB v. Townhouse T.V. & Applicances, Inc., 531 F.2d 826, 828 (7th Cir.
1976), enforcing in relevant part 213 N.L.R.B. 716 (1974); Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d
916 (3d Cir. 1976), enforcing 217 N.L.R.B. 653 (1975); NLRB v. Retail Store Employees
Union, Local 876, 570 F.2d 586, 590 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 819 (1978), enforcing
219 N.L.R.B. 1188 (1975); Singer Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 172, 179-80 (8th Cir. 1970), enforc-
ing in part 176 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1969).
48. The Board in Wright Line I addressed opponents' criticisms of the "in-part" test:
[I]n a dual motivation case, the employer does have a legitimate reason for its
action. Yet, an improper reason for discharge is also present. Thus, the employer's
recognized right to enforce rules of its own choosing is viewed as being in practical
conflict with the employees' right to be free from adverse effects brought about by
[Vol. 33:279
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reasoned that the "in-part" standard allowed the Board to find a section
8(a)(3) violation on the strength of a prima facie case alone even though
the employer may have had a sufficient legitimate business reason for the
discharge.4 9 The First Circuit, which later rejected the Board's analysis in
Transportation Management Corp., was the leading critic of the "in-part"
test as well.50 To remedy what it viewed as a misallocation of the burden
of proof, the First Circuit developed its own method of analyzing mixed
motive section 8(a)(3) cases. Termed the "dominant motive" test, the court
required the NLRB General Counsel to prove that an employee's union
involvement was the primary motive for the employer's discipline. 1 In an
attempt to abate confusion over the distinction between the Board's "in-
part" standard and its own "dominant motive" test, the First Circuit subse-
quently abandoned the test for a more exacting "but for" causation stan-
dard. This "but for" standard became synonymous with the earlier
"dominant motive" test: the General Counsel must establish a prima facie
case by proving that discrimination was a motivating factor; following the
employer's assertion of a legitimate business justification, the General
Counsel must then prove that the employee would not have been dis-
charged "but for" his union activity. 2 In other words, to find a violation,
the General Counsel must not only prove the prima facie case but must
also disprove the employer's asserted legitimate business reasons for the
discipline. The disagreement between the Board and the courts over the
their participation in protected activities. Critics of the 'in-part' test have asserted
that rather than seeking to resolve this conflict and accommodate the legitimate
competing interests, the analysis goes only half way, in that once hostility to pro-
tected rights is found, the inquiry ends and the employer's plea of legitimate justifi-
cation is ignored.
Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1084 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
49. See Wright Line , 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089.
50. See, e.g., NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 669-71 (1st Cir.
1979) ("in part" test unduly favors employee); NLRB v. Billen Shoe Co., 397 F.2d 801, 803
(1st Cir. 1968) ("in part" test overly protective because employee need only plead existence
of antiunion animus); NLRB v. Lowell Sun Pub. Co., 320 F.2d 835, 842 (lst Cir. 1963)
(partial motive test may lead "militant union man" to behave as he pleases).
51. The foundation of the "dominant motive" test was laid in 1953 in NLRB v. Whitin
Mach. Works, 204 F.2d 883, 885 (1st Cir. 1953); Lowell Sun Publishing Co., 320 F.2d 835,
842 (1st Cir. 1963) (Aldrich, J., concurring); see also NLRB v. Billen Shoe Co. 397 F.2d 801
(Ist Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Fibers Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311, 1311-12 (1st Cir. 1971); NLRB v.
South Shore Hosp., 571 F.2d 677, 684-85 (1st Cir. 1978).
52. See, e.g., NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 669-72 (1st Cir.
1979); Coletti's Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1292, 1293 (1st Cir. 1977); cf. Lewis &
Fisher, supra note 44, at 886-88 (the "dominant motive" test became synonymous with the
"but for" test); see also supra note 14 for a discussion of the "but for" test.
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burden of proof in section 8(a)(3) law53 spread throughout the circuit
courts, creating further confusion and uncertainty. 54
2. The Impact of the Board's Wright Line Decision
In an attempt to both resolve the conflict and accommodate the concerns
of the critics of the Board's in-part test, the Board issued the Wright Line I
decision." The Wright Line I decision relied predominantly on the ration-
ale of Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 6 a first
amendment case decided by the Supreme Court in 1977. Although Mt.
Healthy addressed a dual motive discharge in the context of first amend-
ment guarantees, it raised issues of causation applicable to the labor con-
text. In Mt. Healthy, the Mt. Healthy School Board decided not to renew
an untenured teacher's contract in part because he had informed a radio
station of a new school policy.57 The Supreme Court, reversing the lower
court ruling, held that the School Board's action, although unlawful, did
not necessarily warrant a remedy if supported by legitimate and sufficient
reasons.58 The Court reasoned that where such legitimate bases exist, a
discharged employee should not be put "in a better position as a result of
the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have oc-
53. See Coletti's Furniture, 550 F.2d at 1293 ("IT]here can be little reason for us to
rescue the Board hereafter if it does not both articulate and apply our rule.").
54. Compare Allen v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("A discharge is un-
lawful if motivated even in part by antiunion animus.") and Penasquitos Village, Inc. v.
NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1977), denying enforcement of 217 N.L.R.B. 878 (1975) (ap-
plied "in part" analysis) with Midwest Regional Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers
v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 434, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[Tlhe Board must find that the employee
would not have been discharged but for his union activity.") and Western Exterminator Co.
v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1114, 1118 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977) (union activities must be dominant or
moving cause).
Some courts refused to apply either test. See, e.g., Edgewood Nursing Center, Inc. v.
NLRB, 581 F.2d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 1978) (anti-union animus must be the "real motive");
NLRB v. Aero Corp., 581 F.2d 511, 514-15 (5th Cir. 1978) (antiunion bias must be "reason-
ably equal" to lawful motive to establish a violation).
55. Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
56. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
57. Id at 281-83. Doyle, an untenured teacher in Mt. Healthy, Ohio, and President of
the local Teacher's Association, actively worked to change teachers' working conditions. He
informed a local radio station's disc jockey of the contents of a memorandum from the
school's principal regarding teacher dress codes. The disc jockey broadcast the adoption of
the dress code as a news item. The following month, the School Board denied renewal of
Doyle's contract, citing the radio station incident as partial reason for its decision. (The
School Board also cited an incident where Doyle apparently made an obscene gesture at two
students). Doyle brought suit seeking reinstatement, alleging that the Board had violated his
first amendment rights.
58. Id. at 287.
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cupied had he done nothing."59
Because of the analogous causation issue, the Board relied on Mt.
Healthy in Wright Line. Bernard Lamoureux, a shop inspector employed
by Wright Line, solicited support from plant employees to establish a
union.6" Shortly following two union election campaigns at the plant, a
supervisor noted that Lamoureux had been absent from his assigned de-
partment on two separate occasions and had failed to report these absences
on his time card.6 Invoking a little-used rule against altering time
records, the supervisor had Lamoureux's final paycheck prepared and sub-
sequently discharged him.62 Acting on Lamoureux's section 8(a)(3)
charge, the Board found that the General Counsel had established a prima
facie violation by showing that the employer's invocation of a little-used
disciplinary rule occurred in close sequence to the most recent union elec-
tion.63 Furthermore, the Board found that the employer failed to sustain
its burden of demonstrating a legitimate and sufficient reason for the
discharge. 6'
In a lengthy opinion, the Board expressly rejected the "in-part" test but
59. Id. at 285.
60. See Wright Line , 251 N.L.R.B. at 1090.
61. Id
62. Id
63. Id
64. Id at 1091. An employer's failure to sustain the burden of demonstrating a proper
reason for the discharge does not dispose of the case. The employee through the General
Counsel must show that the employer's action was the causal factor in the injury suffered by
the employee-that is, that disciplinary action discriminated with a purpose of discouraging
union activities. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. As the Supreme Court explained
in Radio Officer's Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954), § 8(a)(3) only prohibits discrimina-
tion intended to discourage union activities. Whether discrimination is prohibited is a fac-
tual question to be determined by an administrative law judge. See id. at 42-45, 50. The
requirement in title VII analysis that the plaintiff prove the actual cause of the discrimina-
tory action stems from the "but for" standard of causation applied in tort law. See Brodin,
The Standard of Causation in the Mixed Motive Title VII ction: A Social Policy Perspective,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 311-16 (1982). Under this tort concept the judge or jury must
determine that the injury would not have occurred in the absence of the defendant's con-
duct. Cf Brodin, supra, at 313. ("[T]he test calls upon the judge or juryman to determine
what would have happened if the defendant had not been guilty of the conduct charged
against him."). The "but for" standard of causation is required to prove discriminatory
intent under title VII. Id at 302.
Moreover, the "but for" rule of causation requires more than simply proving that the
conduct complained of was "a factor"; the conduct must be "a factor that makes a differ-
ence." See Belton, supra note 30, at 1255-56. Thus, under the Board's approach, relief is
granted each time the General Counsel proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
discrimination was a factor in the adverse action. Under title VII "but for" analysis, relief
is granted only if discrimination made the difference in the adverse action-that is, if the
plaintiff can prove that discrimination was the true reason for the employer's adverse action.
Cf. Brodin, supra note 30, at 302.
19831
Catholic University Law Review
maintained many of the principles underlying that test.65 The Board
stated that such principles have traditionally involved analyzing the em-
ployer's asserted justification to determine whether it is sufficiently proven
"to negate the General Counsel's showing of prohibited motivation."66
According to the Board, establishing an unfair labor practice "require[s]
that the General Counsel make aprimafacie showing sufficient to support
the inference that protected conduct was a 'motivating factor' in the em-
ployer's decision."67 Once the Board establishes a prima facie case, "the
burden will shift to the employer to demonstrate that the same action
would have taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct."68
The Board noted that it was adopting a test which places the burden of
proving the existence of an independent and sufficient basis for the deci-
sion on the employer, rather than on the General Counsel.69 In a footnote,
the Board characterized this requirement as an affirmative defense, con-
cluding that the ultimate burden of establishing the presence of an unfair
labor practice remains with the General Counsel.7"
Subsequent courts criticized the Board's affirmative defense characteri-
65. Wright Line 1, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089.
[I]nherent in the adoption of the foregoing analysis is our recognition of the advan-
tage of clearing the air by abandoning the 'in part' language in expressing our
conclusion as to whether the Act was violated. Yet, our abandonment of this fa-
miliar phraseology should not be viewed as a repudiation of the well-established
principles and concepts which we have applied in the past.
Id.
66. Id. at 1088 (footnote omitted).
67. Id at 1089. Commentators have noted, however, that the "motivating factor" lan-
guage is no greater a quantum of proof than the "in part" test applied previously by the
Board. See, e.g., Lewis & Fisher, supra note 44, at 894-96. The Board itself has stated in
commentary that "Wright Line ... does not ... alter the standard by which the Board
determines whether a litigant has carried its burden of proof." Truesdale, Recent Trends at
the NLRB and in the Courts, 32 LAB. L.J. 131, 134 (1981).
68. Wright Line !, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089 (footnote omitted).
69. Id at 1087. The Board stated that the employee is required only to show initially
that the employer's adverse decision was motivated in part by discriminatory intent. The
employer must then establish its asserted legitimate justification. The issue of which party
bears the burden of proving the existence of an independent justification is crucial because it
may determine the outcome of the case. Id
70. Id at 1088 n.ll. The Board went on to state:
It should be noted that this shifting of burdens does not undermine the estab-
lished concept that the General Counsel must establish an unfair labor practice by
a preponderance of the evidence. The shifting burden merely requires the em-
ployer to make out what is actually an affirmative defense . . . to overcome the
primafacie case of wrongful motive. Such a requirement does not shift the ulti-
mate burden.
See also infra note 112 for discussion of courts' criticisms of the Board's characterization of
the employer's burden as an affirmative defense.
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zation. The courts asserted that labeling the employer's burden an affirm-
ative defense suggested that the entire burden of persuasion shifted to the
employer to prove it had not violated the Act. The practical effect of the
Board's Wright Line decision was, however, to require an administrative
law judge, or the Board, to consider an employer's legitimate business rea-
sons when determining whether to order reinstatement, rather than simply
ending the inquiry after the General Counsel establishes a prima facie
case.71 Although the Board intended the Wright Line decision to "allevi-
ate the intolerable confusion in the section 8(a)(3) area,"72 the Board's lan-
guage generated controversy among the circuit courts as to whether the
methodology was a permissible allocation of the burden of proof in section
8(a)(3) discrimination cases.
a. Circuit Courts Rejecting the Board's Wright Line Anaysis
Initially, critics of the Board's "in-part" test welcomed the Wright Line
decision, viewing it as an alignment of the Board's approach with their
own.13 By 1983, however, the First, Second,. Third and Seventh Circuits
had clearly repudiated the Board's Wright Line rule.74 The First Circuit
was the first court clearly to reject imposing a requirement on the employer
to prove the existence of a legitimate and sufficient cause for the dis-
charge.75 Six months later, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Behring International v. NLRB rejected the Board's Wright
Line test as improperly shifting the burden of proof on the issue of the
Company's motive.76 The decision thoroughly outlines the court's reason-
ing for rejecting the Board's methodology.
In Behring, eight employees were laid off shortly after a union election,
71. See Wright Line I, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1084 (Courts criticized the "in part" test because
it terminated the inquiry as to the existence of a violation with the establishment of a prima
facie case.); accord Lewis & Fisher, supra note 44, at 883; see also supra notes 44-54 and
accompanying text.
72. Wright Line 1, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089.
73. See Statler Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1981). This case followed
Wright Line's requirement that the employer assert legitimate cause for its action but vigor-
ously denied that the Wright Line test required the employer to prove legitimate cause in
order to avoid N.L.R.A. penalties. See also Lederer, supra note 25, at 76-77.
74. See, e.g., Wright Line HI, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989
(1982), supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text; Behring Int'l v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 83 (3d
Cir. 1982), infra notes 76-88 and accompanying text; NLRB v. Webb Ford, Inc., 689 F.2d
733 (7th Cir. 1982), infra notes 90-98; NLRB v. New York Univ. Medical Center, 702 F.2d
284 (2d Cir. 1983), infra notes 100-12 and accompanying text.
75. See Wright Line HI, 662 F.2d 899 (lst Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); see
also supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
76. Behring, 675 F.2d at 88 ("The shifting burden of persuasion undermines the 'but
for' test and reintroduces the confusion which Wright Line purported to eliminate.").
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and the company subcontracted with an outside firm for replacement la-
bor.77 The company argued that its actions were necessary because of a
severe decline in business, but evidence showed that the employer's agents
had discouraged the employees' union organization drive. An administra-
tive law judge found that the General Counsel established a prima facie
case by showing that the employer had granted substantial benefits to em-
ployees prior to the union election, had threatened plant closure if the
union were voted in, and had interrogated an employee to discover names
of union organizers.78 The Board found that although the employer as-
serted that a severe decline in business necessitated laying off workers and
subcontracting labor to reduce costs, the company was motivated in part
by a desire to reduce the likelihood of another union election.79 The
Board found violations of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) because the com-
pany's economic defense was insufficient to rebut the General Counsel's
prima facie case.
The Third Circuit, in denying enforcement, remanded the case, ordering
the Board to consider whether the employer's asserted business justifica-
tion was sufficient to preclude reinstatement in light of evidence that the
layoffs were neither limited to union activists nor were they in close prox-
imity to a future union election."0 The court maintained that requiring the
employer to prove a legitimate and sufficient reason for the discharges con-
travened section 10(c) of the N.L.R.A., the Board's own administrative
regulations,8' and section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act82 be-
cause these statutory provisions impose the burden of proving an unfair
labor practice solely on the General Counsel, not on the employer.83 The
Third Circuit rejected the Board's approach, arguing that it vitiated the
77. Id at 84.
78. Id. at 85.
79. Id
80. Id. at 90-91.
81. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.10(b) (1981) which provides that "[tihe Board's attorney has the
burden of proof of violations of section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act."
82. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976) which provides in part:
"Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of
proof."
83. In explaining its reasoning, the court stated:
[I]n establishing aprimafacie case, the General Counsel need not prove that antiu-
nion discrimination was the 'real cause' of the employee's discharge. Instead, the
Wright Line procedure only requires the General Counsel to show that antiunion
animus was 'a' motivating factor in the employer's decision. If the employer then
proffers a legitimate reason for its action, but does not do so with enough weight to
carry the burden of persuasion, the Board would rule that the § 8(a)(3) charge had
been proved. This would be so despite the fact that two factors-neither outweigh-
ing the other-had been advanced as causes, and the Board never determined
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General Counsel's duty to prove the unfair labor practice by no longer
requiring the General Counsel to prove that antiunion motive was the
"real cause" of the discipline. The court criticized the Board's rule because
a violation would be found if, after the General Counsel has demonstrated
that antiunion motive was a factor, the employer fails to respond with
enough evidence to outweigh the prima facie showing. This, in the court's
view, required the employer to prove the "real cause," rather than the
General Counsel.
8 4
The court, instead, adopted the procedural methodology of title VII dis-
crimination cases.8 5 This procedure requires that after the complainant
establishes a prima facie case of discriminatory conduct, the respondent
need only come forward with some evidence showing that a legitimate
business reason motivated its action. 6 If the employer meets this burden,
the burden then shifts to the complainant to prove that the employer's
proffered legitimate reason is not the true reason. 7 Concluding that the
ultimate burden of proof may not shift to the employer at any stage, the
court remanded the case to the Board for a determination of whether the
"General Counsel ha[d] proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
the employer's antiunion animus was the real cause of the discharge. '"88
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, like other
circuit courts, had initially adopted the Board's Wright Line test.89 The
which was the real one. As such, the procedural aspect is plainly at odds with the
'but for' test.
Behring, 675 F.2d at 88.
84. See supra note 64 for a discussion of the "but for" standard of causation.
85. The Third Circuit relied on Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248 (1981); Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978);
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). In these cases, the Court had outlined
the procedures to be followed in title VII employment discrimination cases. The Third Cir-
cuit preferred this approach to the Board's Wright Line analysis because, under title VII
analysis, the defendant need only articulate a legitimate business reason for its adverse ac-
tion and need not prove justification by presenting enough evidence to outweigh the plain-
tif's prima facie case. To establish a statutory violation, the burden then shifts back to the
plaintiff to prove that the legitimate reason offered by the employer is not the true reason.
Behring, 675 F.2d at 88-89.
86. Behring, 675 F.2d at 89.
87. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53 (citing McDonell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802-04 (1983)). For a further discussion of title VII analysis and a comparative analysis
to the Board's § 8(a)(3) analysis, see supra note 64.
88. Behring, 675 F.2d at 90. This reasoning was affirmed in a later Third Circuit case
where the court also held that the Board had misallocated the burden of persuasion. See
United Parcel Serv. v. NLRB, 113 L.R.R.M. (B.N.A.) 2174 (3d Cir. Apr. 18, 1983).
89. Cf. Peavey Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1981). The Peavey court held:
"We have reviewed the decisions and have decided to follow the Mt. Healthy!Wright Line
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court, however, in a subsequent case, NLRB v. Webb Ford, Inc., 90 rejected
the Wright Line I approach in favor of the Third Circuit's rationale in
Behring. A new collective bargaining agreement between Webb Ford and
its mechanics and body shop employees had created problems in the
method of computing pay.9 Two service department mechanics, Jeffery
Goffe and Randall VanderWoude, pressed for resolution of the wage dis-
putes.92 Because the employees were union activists, the company service
manager reassigned the two employees to warranty work, in direct conflict
with a company policy.93 As a result of their work reassignments, both
Goffe and VanderWoude received numerous warning letters for failure to
accumulate billable time and were each subsequently discharged.94 The
Seventh Circuit reversed the administrative law judge's finding of a viola-
tion, holding that the timing of a discharge alone is "too slender a reed" to
support a finding of a prima facie case. The court therefore concluded that
the General Counsel had failed to establish a prima facie case of unlawful
motivation.95 Although not faced with the issue, the court went on to con-
sider the procedural burden of proof issue to assist the administrative law
judge on remand.96 In the Seventh Circuit's view, shifting the burden of
persuasion to the employer to show a legitimate and sufficient reason for
the discharge contravened section 10(c) of the N.L.R.A. 97 Like the Third
Circuit, the court adopted the procedural methodology used in title VII
cases which requires only that the employer rebut the prima facie case by
asserting a legitimate reason for its action, while "the burden of demon-
strating that reason pretextual remains with the Board."9"
Immediately following the Board's Wright Line decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted the Board's ap-
proach,99 but later rejected Wright Line I as imposing an "improper stan-
test in 'dual motive' cases in this Circuit. Our review of the record as a whole convinces us
that Peavey Company met its burden under the Wright Line decision." Id at 461.
90. 689 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1982).
91. Id at 735.
92. Id at 736.
93. Id
94. Id
95. Id at 739.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id The court explained the reasons for its "about-face" saying:
[T]o the extent a formulation of the [Wright Line] test imposed upon an employer
the burden of persuasion to show that it would have discharged the employee even
in the absence of the protected conduct, it ran afoul of the Labor Act's strictures on
burdens of proof as found at 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
Id (footnote omitted).
99. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Donovan, 673 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982). The case
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dard of proof' in NLRB v. New York University Medical Center. 100
During a campaign to choose delegates to a national convention of the
National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, three employees
who belonged to a splinter political organization initiated an aggressive
leafletting campaign to garner votes.' °' The text of the leaflets criticized
the Hospital Center's racial employment practices. As a result, the Center
issued warning letters to all three employees, suspended two, and dis-
charged one because of his leafletting activities.' 02 The Second Circuit,
reversing the Board's finding of a section 8(a)(3) violation, held that the
Board's Wright Line analysis exceeded its statutory authority by permit-
ting the finding of an unfair labor practice when the evidence is in equi-
poise. The Court thus concluded that the Board's approach contravened
the allocation of proof set forth in section 10(c) of the N.L.R.A.10 3
In the most thorough analysis by a circuit court of appeals of the proce-
dure required under section 10(c), the Second Circuit argued that the
Board may not allocate the burden of proof on the issue of motive to the
employer because "shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer vio-
lates [the] statutory mandate [of section 10(c)]."'" The court would have
permitted a requirement that an employer rebut the showing of unlawful
motivation by introducing evidence of independent legitimate justification
for its action. This would bring all possible reasons for the employer's
disciplinary action before the Board for its consideration in determining
arose under the Energy Reorganization Act but the Second Circuit nonetheless applied the
Board's Wright Line test used in N.L.R.A. dual motive cases. Citing Mt. Healthy, the court
allocated the burden of proving legitimate cause to the employer. Without analysis, the
court stated that "we should adopt the rule enunciated in the Mi. Healthy case which places
the burden on the employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
reached the same decision as to the employee's dismissal even in the absence of the pro-
tected conduct." Id at 62-63. Based on the evidence, the court concluded that "a review of
the testimony in conjunction with the findings made by the ALJ compels the conclusion that
Con Edison has failed to sustain its burden of proof." Id. at 63.
100. 702 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1983). The court distinguished the earlier Consolidated Edison
case by noting that it had arisen under the Energy Reorganization Act and therefore the
court had no statutory counterpart comparable to § 10(c) requiring proof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. Id at 294 n.10.
101. Id at 286.
102. Id at 287-88.
103. Id at 293-94. The court explained that because the Board's Wright Line test does
not require the General Counsel to prove that unlawful motive is the "but for" cause, the
employer is forced to present enough evidence to convince the trier of fact that the "'real'
motivation for the discipline" is the employer's legitimate business reason. The court rea-
soned that assigning this "ultimate burden of persuasion" to the employer is error. Id at
294.
104. Id at 293.
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whether discriminatory intent actually caused the discipline.'i 5 The court
held, however, that the Board's methodology improperly shifted the ulti-
mate burden of persuasion to an employer, thus creating an imbalance
between employer and employee rights in contravention of the
N.L.R.A.' 0 6 In the court's view, the Board's method shifted the ultimate
burden of persuasion in contravention of section 10(c) so that any case in
which both parties had presented evidence of equal weight would result in
a finding that the employer had violated section 8(a)(3). Under the Second
Circuit's approach, evidence in equipoise should result in a finding that the
General Counsel failed to establish a violation by a preponderance of the
evidence. '
0 7
The court examined in detail the legislative history of section 10(c) and
found it inconclusive. The Senate colloquy between Senator Taft and Sen-
ator Pepper, relied on by the Board to support its Wright Line analysis,
merely reflected uncertainty of the effect of section 10(c).' 8 Moreover, the
Second Circuit maintained that Congress intended to limit the discretion
exercised by the Board under the N.L.R.A.,' 0 9 and the Board's Wright
Line analysis evidenced an absence of such limitation on the Board's dis-
cretion, because it did not require the General Counsel to prove that the
employer's antiunion motive was the "real" or "but for" cause." 0 Accord-
ing to the Second Circuit, Congress feared the Board might automatically
reinstate union activists without fully analyzing whether legitimate reasons
105. See id. at 292-94.
106. Id at 292.
107. Id at 294.
108. See New York Univ. Medical Center, 702 F.2d at 295-98; see also supra note 41 -and
accompanying text.
109. But see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
The court in New York Univ. Medical Center, 702 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1983), noted that
Congress, by enacting the Taft-Hartley Act, sought to limit the discretion exercised by the
Board under the Wagner Act. The original House bill placed the burden upon the General
Counsel to prove that an employee had not been discharged for cause. The court inferred
that the Members of the House wished to require the General Counsel to determine whether
the employer's unlawful motive was the "real" reason for the discipline, rather than merely
to infer discriminatory motive from the fact of the disciplinary act. The Senate amend-
ments, however, omitted the provision requiring the General Counsel to show "cause." The
Second Circuit observed, however, that the conference version of the bill reinserted the "for
cause" proviso to § 10(c) reformulated to expressly prohibit the Board from reinstating an
individual who had been discharged for cause. The court, therefore, interpreted the confer-
ence committee's version of the "for cause" proviso as merely a restatement of the House
bill's original requirement that the Board should bear the burden of proving that a legiti-
mate motive was not the actual basis for discharge. See New York Univ. Medical Center, 702
F.2d at 295.
110. New York Univ. Medical Center, 702 F.2d at 294.
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existed for discipline.' It would logically follow that Congress must also
have meant to require the General Counsel to prove that an employee was
not discharged for cause.1 12
Together, these circuit courts have advanced the view that the Board's
Wright Line test contravened the legislative strictures of section 10(c) re-
quiring the General Counsel to bear the risk of nonpersuasion in a mixed
motive case. Specifically, the courts objected to the Board's Wright Line
methodology as violating section 10(c) by placing a portion of the burden
of proof on the employer. These courts further objected to allowing the
General Counsel to prevail solely on the strength of a prima facie showing
of prohibited motivation should the employer fail to prove its affirmative
defense." 3 These circuit courts maintained that permitting such slight evi-
dence of discriminatory motive to establish a violation would unreasona-
bly displace the section 10 burden of proving discriminatory motive from
111. Accord H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, at 333 (1948)
(employers have been required to reinstate employees who have destroyed property and
assaulted other employees). Members of the House attempted to limit the Board's discretion
in reinstating employees; they were concerned that in some cases the Board had inferred
discriminatory motive from the employer's adverse action without determining the "real
cause" for the action.
112. See New York Univ. Medical Center, 702 F.2d at 297. The court in New York Univ.
Medical Center also attacked the Board's characterization of the employer's burden as an
affirmative defense. See 702 F.2d at 294 n.9; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
In the court's view, an affirmative defense clearly shifts the burden of persuasion of a partic-
ular issue and is usually reserved for those situations in which a defendant must prove a fact
which bears no necessary relationship to an element of the charged offense. Id The court
reasoned that because the Board's methodology forced the employer to negate the prima
facie element of motivation, the employer's burden in a mixed motive case could not be an
affirmative defense. Id The court stated:
[T]here is no question that an affirmative defense at least shifts the burden of per-
suasion on the particular issue-in this case whether the employer had a legitimate
reason for reaching the decision to discipline the employees. . . . But the burden
[of proof] shifts in this case on the issue of 'causation' which lies at the heart of the
8(a)(l) charge-was the unlawful motive a 'but for' cause of the decision to disci-
pline? Thus, it is quite unpersuasive to claim that the burden is shifted on only the
one issue and that the ultimate burden rests with the Board--there is no other issue
in the case.
Id. Thus, by characterizing the employer's burden as an affirmative defense, the Board,
according to the Second Circuit, reallocated the burden of persuasion. In effect, the em-
ployer rather than the General Counsel must prove the prima facie element of causation or
else lose the case. See generally Belton, supra note 30, at 1207 (This commentator notes that
the "[b]urden of proof govern[s] the process of fact-finding." The burdens of production and
persuasion are both elements of the burden of proof. The burden of persuasion determines
the party who must convince the trier of fact or lose the case. The burden of production
determines the timing of the presentation of evidence.).
113. See Zurn Indus. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 683, 688 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
3110 (1983), infra notes 138-47.
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the General Counsel to the employer." 4
This view reflected both a strong concern for the employer's section
10(c) right to discharge for cause and an antipathy for the Board's practice
of inferring an overriding unlawful motive without an adequate showing
by the Board's General Counsel of evidence from which to infer discrimi-
natory motive. Moreover, these decisions suggest that when the evidence
is in equipoise, the balance should be struck in favor of the employer be-
cause, although the employer has acted unlawfully, the General Counsel
has not established that unlawful motives were the preponderant cause of
the employer's action. According to these courts, the absence of a demon-
strated and overriding intent to "encourage or discourage union member-
ship" should preclude finding a violation.
b. Circuit Courts Accepting the Board's Wright Line Analysis
The Fifth," 5 Sixth,1 6 Eighth, 17 and Ninth"' Circuits have either ex-
114. See Transportation Management Corp., 674 F.2d 130, 132 (lst Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103
S. Ct. 2469 (1983).
115. See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
116. A series of cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit have
cited Wright Line I with approval but without thorough analysis of the contested burden of
proof issue. See, e.g., Borel Restaurant Corp. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1982);
Charge Card Ass'n v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Consolidated Freight-
ways Corp., 651 F.2d 436 (6th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 651 F.2d 442
(6th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Allen's I.G.A. Foodliner, 651 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1981).
In Borel Restaurant Corp. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1982), for example, a restau-
rant manager fired a waiter, Patrick Passante, an active union organizer, for allegedly drink-
ing while on the job. Id at 192. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Board's holding that the
employer failed to demonstrate legitimate and sufficient reason for the discharge. Id at 193.
The evidence showed that Borel failed to discharge a second employee known to be drinking
with Passante during the same incident. Id On this basis, the court expressly approved the
Board's Wright Line rule requiring the employer to show cause and found that Borel failed
to carry its burden of presenting sufficient evidence to show legitimate cause for discipline.
Id
117. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit approved Wright Line I,
and specifically rejected the First Circuit's criticism of the Board's approach. See NLRB v.
Fixtures Mfg. Corp., 669 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1982). In Fixtures, two union activists were
discharged, one for allegedly failing to cooperate in a company investigation of thefts, and
the other because the results of a forced polygraph test implicated him in the thefts. Id at
549. The Board ordered both employees reinstated because it found that the polygraph tests
had been administered to retaliate against the employees' union organization activities. Id
at 549-50. The Eighth Circuit enforced the order in part, but remanded the case to the
Board to determine whether the conduct of the employee implicated in the thefts justified his
dismissal in spite of the employer's impermissible conduct. Id at 552. The court concluded
without analysis that placing a burden on the employer to prove legitimate cause for the
discharge is within the Board's authority to structure its fact-finding process. Id at 550 &
n.4.
Eight months later, in NLRB v. Senftner Volkswagen Corp., 681 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1982),
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plicitly or implicitly accepted the Board's Wright Line test. " 9 All but the
Ninth Circuit have accepted the Board's methodology without detailed
analysis, which suggests a summary rejection of critics' objections to the
Board's rule. In Red Ball Motor Freight v. NLRB, 120 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, despite earlier indications to the
contrary,12 1 endorsed the Board's approach without detailing its analysis.
A clerical employee who had protested certain employment practices by
Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., was suddenly discharged for allegedly refus-
ing to start work on time.' 22 The Board found that after the General
Counsel had made a prima facie showing that the employee's protected
section 7 activities had been a motivating factor in the discharge, Red Ball
had failed to establish a legitimate and sufficient reason for the dis-
charge.' 23 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Board's methodology.' 24 Red
Ball argued that the Board's Wright Line approach improperly requires the
employer to prove its innocence in derogation of management's right to
discharge for cause under section 10(c).125 By rejecting this argument, the
court implied that the employer's proof of "good cause" is independent of
the court followed Wright Line I but held that because no evidence was introduced to sup-
port the employer's alleged reason for discharge, the reasons were pretextual. Again, the
court failed to reach the burden of proof issue. Senftner, 681 F.2d at 560.
118. See infra notes 126-47 and accompanying text; but see Royal Development Co. v.
NLRB, 703 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1983). Despite the Ninth Circuit's adherence to Wright Line
I, the Royal Development Co. court rejected the argument that Board interpretations of the
N.L.R.A. must be given deference by the courts. Instead it relied on pre- Wright Line cases
to reject the requirement that the employer prove legitimate cause. The court found it un-
necessary to determine which party properly bore the burden of proof because the evidence
supported a § 8(a)(3) violation and the employer was unable to justify its conduct. Id at
370, 372.
119. See infra notes 120-51 and accompanying text.
The Fourth Circuit also accepted shifting the burden of proof but it did not rely on Wright
Line! for this holding. See NLRB v. Kiawah Island Co., 650 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1981). The
Court in Kiawah characterized the employer's burden of showing legitimate cause as simply
a weighing of the evidence. The court concluded that, if the evidence of employer animus is
unrebutted, the Board must find a § 8(a)(3) violation, as long as the Board's evidence consti-
tuted more than suspicion and conjecture. Id at 491.
120. 660 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 997 (1982).
121. See TRW, Inc. v. NLRB, 654 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1981). The court held that the
employer need only articulate a legitimate business reason for its action after which the
General Counsel must prove that antiunion animus was the "moving cause" of the disci-
pline. Id at 310. The court apparently did not rely on Wright Line I, citing it in a footnote
for the limited proposition that when an employer advances a legitimate reason for its ac-
tion, the case cannot properly be considered a pretext case. Id at 312 n.3.
122. 660 F.2d at 627.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id Two other Fifth Circuit cases recited the Wright Line I rule but without com-
ment. See NLRB v. Robin Am. Corp., 654 F.2d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1981), mod#Fed and
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the prima facie case of discriminatory intent which the General Counsel
must prove in order to establish a violation.
Among the courts accepting Wright Line I, the Ninth Circuit is the only
one to have set forth its rationale in detail. In NLRB v. Nevis Industries,
Inc., 126 the company acquired a hotel whose engineering employees were
represented by Stationary Engineers, Local 39. 127 Nevis refused to bar-
gain with Local 39 regarding the retention of its engineers and conditioned
retention of one employee on his resignation from the union.
128
Futhermore, Nevis attempted to persuade other service employees to with-
draw from the union. A company supervisor stated that he wanted the
hotel to be nonunion and, therefore, refused to employ the entire engineer-
ing crew.' 2 9 The company claimed that its decision was based on the engi-
neers' poor work attitudes. 130 Based on this evidence, the Ninth Circuit
labeled as pretext the employer's asserted reason for discharging the em-
ployees,131 thus never reaching the burden of proof issue.
The court did, however, discuss as dicta its reasons for adopting Wright
Line I. The Ninth Circuit asserted that the Board's interpretations of the
N.L.R.A. are entitled to considerable deference 132 and that the Board's
Wright Line rule is a "reasonably defensible interpretation of the
Act .... 133 The court apparently based its conclusion on an analysis of
the Senate colloquy between Senator Taft and Senator Pepper,' 34 and con-
cluded without explicit analysis that the colloquy revealed an intent to im-
pose the burden of proving "good cause" on the employer, rather than the
General Counsel.' 35 Furthermore, the court noted that the employer is
likely to have better access to proof of motivation. 36 In the Ninth Cir-
cuit's view, the Board's approach maintained a proper balance between
employee and employer rights. A showing by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that antiunion motive was a contributing factor establishes a section
enforced, 667 F.2d 1170 (1982); NLRB v. Charles H. McCauley Assocs., 657 F.2d 685, 688
(5th Cir. 1981).
126. 647 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1981); but see supra note 118 (The Ninth Circuit changed its
approach in 1983.).
127. Id. at 907.
128. Id
129. Id at 909.
130. Id at 910.
131. Id.
132. For a discussion of the respective roles of the Board and the courts in interpreting
the federal labor laws, see infra note 148.
133. Nevis, 647 F.2d at 909.
134. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
135. Nevis, 647 F.2d at 909.
136. Id See also infra note 204 and accompanying text.
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8(a)(3) violation, thus protecting employees' section 7 rights. The em-
ployer, however, retains an opportunity to present evidence to avoid a vio-
lation in furtherance of its right to discharge employees for cause. 137
A year later in Zurn Industries v. NLRB, 138 the court again affirmed the
Board's Wright Line approach but detailed the reasoning behind some of
its conclusions in Nevis. In Zurn, workers constructing concrete cooling
towers at a nuclear power plant complained for several months of the lack
of safety devices on the job site.' 3 9 A supervisor threatened the employees
that continued complaints would result in loss of their jobs. 140 The com-
pany subsequently discharged the employees, asserting that the workers
had improperly poured concrete,' 4 ' but later admitted that the employees'
safety complaints had provided additional motivation for the dis-
charges.' 42 The Board found that because the General Counsel had estab-
lished a prima facie case and the employer's asserted reason was
pretextual, the employees were to be reinstated.' 3 The Ninth Circuit,
though not faced with a true mixed motive case, again argued in dicta that
the adoption of Wright Line I is a "reasonably defensible interpretation of
the Act consistent with its purposes.""' In an extensive analysis of the
colloquy between Senator Taft and Senator Pepper concerning placement
of the burden of proving legitimate cause for discipline,' 45 the court held
that the colloquy placed a sufficient gloss on section 10(c) to sustain the
Board's placement of a burden on the employer to prove cause.' 4 6 Noting
that the Wright Line rule does not relieve the General Counsel of its bur-
den of proving an unfair labor practice by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, the Ninth Circuit explained its approach as providing a framework
for establishing legitimate justifications so that the employer may avoid the
violation established by the General Counsel's prima facie case.' 47
The courts accepting the Board's Wright Line rule have based their con-
137. Nevis, 647 F.2d at 909.
138. 680 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3110 (1983).
139. Id at 685.
140. Id
141. Id at 685-86.
142. Id at 686.
143. Id
144. Id at 689.
145. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
146. Zurn, 680 F.2d at 690-93.
147. Id at 693. Four other cases within the Ninth Circuit have adopted Wright Line I
but without analysis. See Doug Hartley, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 579, 580-81 (9th Cir. 1982);
NLRB v. Brooks Cameras, Inc., 691 F.2d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1982); Anja Eng'r Corp. v.
NLRB, 685 F.2d 292, 296 n.10 (9th Cir. 1982); Lippincott Indus. v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 112, 115
(9th Cir. 1981).
19831
Catholic University Law Review
clusions partly on deference to the Board's interpretation of the
N.L.R.A. 148 They characterized their approach not as shifting the burden
of persuasion but rather as a means for both sides to present evidence
which the fact-finder must then weigh. The end result of this approach is
that when the evidence is in equipoise the General Counsel prevails be-
cause the employer has failed to show an independent and sufficient justifi-
cation for its wrong. These circuit courts have determined that the rule is
grounded in equity, because the employer is required to prove information
that is more readily within its knowledge. 4 9 The rule comports with sec-
tion 10 of the N.L.R.A. because requiring an employer to establish an in-
dependent defense does not obviate the General Counsel's duty to prove
that discriminatory intent was a motive for the discharge.' 50 Moreover,
the employer is always a wrongdoer in mixed motive cases, because the
occasion for an employer to establish sufficient cause never arises until the
General Counsel first establishes a prima facie case sufficient to allow the
fact finder to infer that the type of discrimination prohibited by section
8(a)(3) has occurred. Accordingly, it is reasonable to require the employer
to establish any defense it might have. The approach adopted by the
Board and supporting circuit courts places special importance on main-
taining the balance between competing employer and employee interests
in favor of the employee."' The Board's approach protects this balance
by ensuring that proof of discriminatory motive will establish a violation
148. The NLRB has primary responsibility for filling the gaps in our federal labor laws.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (Responsibility for
accommodating the competing interests of employers and employees rests with the Board.
"Its rulings, when reached on findings of fact supported by substantial evidence on the rec-
ord as a whole, should be sustained by the courts unless its conclusions rest on erroneous
legal foundations." (footnote omitted)); see also F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 7,
at 3 (The Board's interpretations of the law will be accepted by the courts as long as, pursu-
ant to § 10(e) of the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976), its factual assumptions are sup-
ported by "substantial evidence on the record as a whole," and its conclusions are not based
on erroneous legal foundations or policy assumptions.). By parity of reasoning, any applica-
tion of the law consistent with the underlying policy assumptions is a valid application of the
law. Cf. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957) (The Board is
responsible for striking the balance between conflicting legitimate interests in order to effec-
tuate national labor policy.).
149. For a discussion of the principles of fairness in allocating burdens of proof, see infra
note 204-05 and acompanying text.
150. See supra note 35.
151. The fundamental difference between the two approaches for allocating the burden
of proof in discriminatory discharge cases may be seen most clearly when the evidence is
evenly balanced. Under the Board's Wright Line approach, if the evidence is in equipoise
the trier of fact will find for the General Counsel. Under the First Circuit's approach, the
court will find for the employer. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 674 F.2d
130, 132 (1st Cir. 1982).
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without also requiring the General Counsel to disprove the employer's as-
serted business justification.
The emergence of distinct positions on the issue of the allocation of the
burden of proof prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in NLRB
v. Transportation Management Corp. 152
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE TO THE Wright Line Critics
A. Affirmation of the Mt. Healthy/Wright Line Approach
In Transportation Management Corp., the United States Supreme Court
resolved this protracted and sometimes acrimonious debate among the
courts of appeals. The Court began its analysis by tracing the Board's and
the courts' interpretations of the elements required to establish an unfair
labor practice violation under section 8(a)(3). The Court noted that the
Board decisions "have consistently held that [an] unfair labor practice con-
sists of a discharge or other adverse action that is based in whole or inpart
on antiunion animus". 53-- or, as the Board restated in Wright Line, that
the employee's protected conduct was a "substantial or motivating factor"in the adverse action. The Court held that the General Counsel must
prove antiunion animus under section 10.155 In an analysis of precedent
predating section 10(c), the Court noted that the Board's practice had al-
ways been to find a section 8(a)(3) violation if the weight of the evidence
demonstrated that the discharge was motivated in any way by antiunion
animus. 15 6
The Court also noted that the Board's decision in Wright Line was
meant to abate the criticism that the Board's methodology could be used to
infer anti-union motive without any consideration of an employer's legiti-
mate reasons for discipline. By setting up the possibility of an affirmative
defense, the employer could escape a finding of a violation if it could es-
tablish a legitimate and sufficient reason for its otherwise unlawful ac-
tion. 57 Moreover, the Court suggested that the Board need not have gone
that far-that in fact its old "in-part" test was permissible under the
152. 103 S. Ct. at 2472.
153. Id at 2474 (emphasis added).
154. Wright Line 1, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089.
155. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. at 2474.
156. Id at 2473. The court relied on Republic Creosoting Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 267 (1940);
Dow Chemical Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 993 (1939), enforced in relevant part, 117 F.2d 455 (6th Cir.
1941); Louisville Refining Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 844 (1938), enforced, 102 F.2d 678 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 568 (1939); Consumers Research, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 57 (1936).
157. 103 S. Ct. at 2474.
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N.L.R.A.1 58 Writing for the Court, Justice White emphasized that ex-
tending this right to the employer as an affirmative defense does not add to
or change the elements of the section 8(a)(3) unfair labor practice. 59
Though the Court acknowledged that the Board's characterization of the
employer's responsibility as an affirmative defense does in fact require the
employer to prove the existence of legitimate and sufficient cause,160 it
concluded that, although such a construction is not required by the Act, it
is "at least permissible under it.' 6' Underlying this determination is the
presumption articulated in earlier circuit court opinions that the employer,
acting in part because of an illegal motive, is a wrongdoer and, therefore,
must bear the risk that a legitimate cause for discharging an employee can-
not be separated from unlawful motives. 162 The Court concluded by en-
dorsing the Board's reliance on the Supreme Court's own Mt. Healthy rule:
once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the employer to prove the same action would have been taken for a legiti-
mate and sufficient business reason.' 63
By affirming the Board's reliance on Mt. Healthy in Wright Line, the
Court's decision in Transportation Management Corp. unanimously affirms
158. Id. at 2474-75. The Court stated:
We also assume that the Board might have considered a showing by the employer
that the adverse action would have occurred in any event as not obviating a viola-
tion adjudication but as going only to the permissible remedy, in which event the
burden of proof could surely have been put on the employer. The Board has in-
stead chosen to recognize, as it insists it has done for many years, what it designates
as an affirmative defense that the employer has the burden of sustaining. We are
unprepared to hold that this is an impermissible construction of the Act.
Id; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
159. 103 S. Ct. at 2474. The Court explained:
[T]he Board's construction of the statute permits an employer to avoid being adju-
dicated a violator by showing what his actions would have been regardless of his
forbidden motivation. It extends to the employer what the Board considers to be
an affirmative defense but does not change or add to the elements of the unfair
labor practice that the General Counsel has the burden of proving under § 10(c).
Id (footnote omitted).
160. Id (The employer carries the burden of proving that the discharge occurred for
valid reasons.).
161. Id at 2475 (quoting NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266-67 (1975) (cita-
tions omitted)).
162. Id. The Court stated:
The employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a motive that is declared illegiti-
mate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the influence of legal and
illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the risk and
because the risk was created not by innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing.
Id.
163. Id. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts and
rationale of Mt. Healthy.
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the Board's approach of characterizing the employer's responsibility as an
independent affirmative defense, rather than as a shifting burden of per-
suasion."6 In so doing, the Supreme Court has clarified the uncertainty
that has plagued section 8(a)(3) law.
B. Clarification of the Elements Required to Establish a Section 8(a)(3)
Violation
Transportation Management Corp. affects section 8(a)(3) law in two ma-
jor ways. First, it clarifies the prima facie elements necessary to establish a
section 8(a)(3) violation and the procedure for allocating the burden of
proof in such an action. Second, it distinguishes dual motive analysis
under the N.L.R.A. from title VII analysis, an approach used by some
lower courts in their rejection of Wright Line 1.165
As noted, the Court's decision affirms the Board's view that a prima
facie violation exists when the General Counsel proves that antiunion ani-
mus contributed in any part to the discharge.' 66 Moreover, the General
Counsel's burden of persuasion of proving antiunion bias does not, at any
time, shift. 167 It is in the Court's explicit recognition of agreement among
the Board and the courts on this issue that the error in the First Circuit's
reasoning becomes clear. 168 Although the lower courts have consistently
held that the General Counsel possessed the ultimate burden of proving
the elements of an unfair labor practice, the courts rejecting Wright Line
required the General Counsel to prove an additional element: that a dis-
charged employee would not have been fired "but for" the employer's un-
lawful motive.'69 The Supreme Court clearly disavowed this requirement
in Transportation Management Corp., stating that the employer's burden
164. 103 S. Ct. at 2475. See supra note 30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
procedural effect of an affirmative defense.
165. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
166. 103 S. Ct. at 2474-75. Compare supra text accompanying notes 153 & 156 with
Wright Line I, 662 F.2d at 906 rn. 11 & 12 (The General Counsel must prove two elements:
that the employer had an unlawful motive and that the employer had no sufficient and valid
reason for the discharge.).
167. 103 S. Ct. at 2474. Compare supra note 28 and accompanying text with note 155 and
accompanying text. The Board and the lower courts had always agreed that the General
Counsel bore the ultimate burden of persuasion. They disagreed, however, on the elements
of a violation that the General Counsel was required to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence to establish a § 8(a)(3) violation. Compare supra notes 113-14 and accompanying
text with supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
168. See Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. at 2474 ("We are quite sure, how-
ever, that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that § 10(c) forbids placing the burden on
the employer to prove that absent the improper motivation he would have acted in the same
manner for wholly legitimate reasons.").
169. See supra note 166.
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"does not change or add to the elements of the unfair labor practice that
the General Counsel has the burden of proving under [section] 10(C).' 17 °
Thus, the Court has rejected the requirement that the General Counsel
prove the legitimate business reason pretextual, a requirement some lower
courts and commentators had read into Wright Line. 7 ' In so holding, the
Court resolved the issue of whether the General Counsel must prove that
the employer's discriminatory motive was the true reason or whether he
must prove only that the discriminatory motive was a reason to establish a
violation. 72
The Court also clearly affirmed the Board's characterization of the em-
ployer's burden as an affirmative defense, holding that once sufficient evi-
dence of antiunion animus has been introduced from which the fact finder
may infer prohibited discrimination, a section 8(a)(3) violation is estab-
lished.1 73 The employer may then assert a legitimate and sufficient justifi-
cation which, if successful, will shield that employer from liability. 174 The
courts rejecting Wright Line I criticized this approach as unfairly requiring
the employer to establish his innocence. However, under the Board's
Wright Line analysis, now approved by the Supreme Court, the General
Counsel establishes a prima facie case once an unlawful motive is estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence, thus demonstrating the em-
ployer to be a wrongdoer. 17  The employer's "burden of persuasion" is,
therefore, a true affirmative defense, because it allows the employer to
avoid the violation by proving a fact unrelated to the prima facie elements
of the violation. 176
Furthermore, Transportation Management Corp. is, as the Court notes,
170. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. at 2474 (footnote omitted). See also
supra note 159 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Wright Line 11, 662 F.2d at 906 n.12.
Our disagreement with the Board may reduce to this: the Board apparently feels
that the Act is violated by a showing of antiunion sentiment in connection with a
discharge. It would then impose an affirmative defense upon the employer to ne-
gate the violation. In our view, by contrast, the Act is violated only when an em-
ployer with antiunion animus discharges an employee he would not have fired 'but
for' the employee's union activities.
See also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
172. Transportation Management Corp. establishes that the General Counsel must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that antiunion animus contributed at least in part to the
adverse action. 103 S. Ct. at 2474-75. Ironically, this appears to be an affirmation of the
Board's original in-part test. See also supra note 64 for a comparison of the "in-part" and
"but-for" quantum of proof.
173. 103 S. Ct. at 2474.
174. Id. See also supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
175. 103 S. Ct. at 2475.
176. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in M. Healthy.177 The
Court in Mt. Healthy determined that an employer accused of interfering
with an employee's first amendment rights must prove legitimate cause for
its adverse action in order to avoid the allegation. 7 Although Mi.
Healthy arose in the context of first amendment guarantees, it raised issues
similar to those in Transportation Management Corp. In Mt. Healthy the
trial court had already determined that a constitutional violation had oc-
curred when it gave the employer an opportunity to prove a legitimate
reason for its action.1 79 The Court, reasoning that an employee should not
be able to insulate himself from discipline by merely engaging in constitu-
tionally protected activity, gave the employer a means of avoiding the con-
sequences of the violation.' 8° The courts rejecting Wright Line I criticized
the Board's reliance on Mt. Healthy in a labor context, because the section
10(c) requirement that the General Counsel prove the elements of a prima
facie case is not applicable in a constitutional context. Therefore, the Mt.
Healthy Court was free to require the employer to prove legitimate reason
for its action. As the Supreme Court noted, however, the proof require-
ments of section 10(c) do not apply to the employer's burden of proving
legitimate cause. Rather, section 10(c) applies only to the General Coun-
sel's burden of proving that an employee's protected conduct was a moti-
vating factor in the employer's adverse action. 8 ' Thus, as in Mt. Healthy,
once the General Counsel in Transportation Management Corp. showed
that antiunion bias contributed to the discharge, the burden that devolved
upon the employer merely provided an opportunity to obviate the viola-
tion. 8 2 Because the two cases presented analogous issues, the Supreme
Court in Transportation Management Corp. affirmed the Board's reliance
on Mt. Healthy 183
In sum, the primary effect of the Supreme Court's affirmation of the Mt.
177. 103 S. Ct. at 2475.
178. M. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. See also supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
179. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 283, 287.
180. Id. at 285-86. See supra note 68-69 and accompanying text.
181. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. at 2474 n.6. As the Court observed,
both the Act, see supra note 4, and the legislative history, see supra notes 40-42 and accom-
panying text, were silent on the procedural requirements for proving an affirmative defense.
"The language [of § 10(c)] . . . requiring that the Board act on a preponderance of the
testimony taken . . . places the burden on the General Counsel only to prove the unfair
labor practice, not to disprove an affirmative defense." 103 S. Ct. at 2474 n.6. See also supra
note 64, discussing proof of the "discrimination" element of § 8(a)(3).
182. 103 S. Ct. at 2474 ("[T]he Board's construction of the statute permits an employer to
avoid being adjudicated a violator by showing what his actions would have been regardless
of his forbidden motivation.") Id
183. 103 S. Ct. at 2475.
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Healthy/Wright Line test is to reaffirm the "in-part" test of causation used
explicitly prior to Wright Line I and implicitly by the Board since Wright
Line I, and to extend to the employer an administratively created defense
that allows the employer to avoid liability despite its section 8(a)(3)
violation.
Of lesser consequence, the Court in Transportation Management Corp.
clarified the distinction between the proof analysis used under title VII and
the mixed-motive analysis applied under the N.L.R.A.' 84 The Court, in a
footnote, explained that the issue in title VII litigation is whether the ac-
tual cause of the adverse action is an illegal discriminatory motive; in a
mixed motive case, the Board, if it adduces sufficient evidence, has already
established the presence of an illegal motive and the existence of a viola-
tion. "I The issue is not, therefore, whether discrimination occurred, but
whether the employer would have taken the same adverse action in spite
of its discriminatory motive, thereby excusing the employer under the "for
cause" limitation in section 10(c). Consequently, in a mixed-motive case,
determining whether the employer's asserted reason is a pretext is not at
issue because both antiunion motive and legitimate business reasons have
already been established as contributing to the adverse action.'
86
Thus, the Court concludes that title VII analysis is inapposite to section
8(a)(3) mixed motive cases. 187 The courts and commentators suggesting
that title VII analysis should apply in all statutory discrimination cases
reason that the ultimate burden of proving discriminatory intent should
always remain on the complainant. 8 8 Furthermore, they argue that the
184. See Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. at 2473 n.5. Compare supra notes
85-87 and accompanying text with supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
185. 103 S. Ct. at 2473 n.5. See supra note 64 for a comparison of title VII methodology
with § 8(a)(3) analysis.
186. The presence of sufficient evidence from which the fact finder may infer antiunion
animus is the determinative factor in finding a violation, not the sufficiency of the em-
ployer's asserted legitimate motive.
The Board, in a mixed motive discharge case under the N.L.R.A., is not concerned with
the "real" or "true" cause as in title VII pretext analysis. See supra notes 85-87 and accom-
panying text. Instead, the Board has adopted the "camel's back" theory: if unlawful motive
contributed in any part to the discharge (i.e., the motive that broke the camel's back), then a
violation is established. See Wright Line 1, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1091 (Member Jenkins, concur-
ring). Member Jenkins, although the first to label the theory as the "camel's back" concept,
merely stated the methodology that the Board had applied since passage of the N.L.R.A.
See supra note 156 and accompanying text for Board precedent adopting the "in-part" stan-
dard. See also Truesdale, supra note 67, at 132; Note, supra note 25, at 232 n.34; NLRB v.
Charles Batchelder Co., 646 F.2d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 1981) (Pretext analysis asks "What hap-
pened?" Mixed motive analysis asks "What would have happened if the unlawful motive
were absent?"); see also supra note 64.
187. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. at 2473 n.5.
188. See supra notes 75-114 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court has advanced no plausible explanation for applying differ-
ent procedural methodologies in different types of discrimination cases. 8 9
The Supreme Court, however, in Transportation Management Corp., sum-
marily rejected the notion that the procedural methodology of title VII
universally applies to all types of discrimination cases. One commentator
noted that application of the same standard of causation in all areas of
discrimination "reflects an apparent failure to recognize the significant dis-
tinctions between the types of discrimination involved and the different
legislative goals underlying these similarly worded enactments."' 90 The
Court's footnote recognizes that proof of the actual cause of the adverse
action, as required by title VII analysis, was not the intent of Congress in
enacting section 10.
The Court analyzed the legislative goals of the N.L.R.A. and deter-
mined that the NLRB's methodology, requiring only that a discriminatory
motive be a factor in the adverse action, comports with the Act. 19' Al-
though the purpose of the N.L.R.A. is to remedy the imbalance of power
between employers and employees,192 Congress sought to achieve this goal
primarily by protecting the collective bargaining process. 93 The 1947
Taft-Hartley amendments to the N.L.R.A. were enacted, however, in part
to preserve the employer's right to fire employees for cause, in the interests
of maintaining an "efficient and productive" work force.' 94 Specifically,
the "for cause" amendment to section 10(c) was enacted at least in part
because of Congressional disapproval of the Board's practice of inferring
antiunion animus and reinstating employees who had engaged in gross
189. See Belton, supra note 30, at 1209; Note, supra note 8, at 334. This Note argues that
the Board's Wright Line decision adopted a "but for" test requiring the General Counsel to
prove "that the employee would not have been discharged 'but for' his protected union
activities." The author concludes that the Board needs to move even further away from its
"in-part" test, because it is inconsistent with the N.L.R.A., and the Board should adopt a
procedure similar to title VII analysis.
190. See Brodin, supra note 64, at 310 n.80.
191. See supra notes 115-151 and accompanying text.
192. See S. REP. No. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935, at 1 (1949) (The purpose
of the N.L.R.A. is to "equalize the bargaining power of employers and employees. .. .");
see also American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316-17 (1965) (purpose of
N.L.R.A. is to remedy imbalance of power between employer and employee).
193. See DuRoss, Toward Rationality in Discriminatory Discharge Cases: The Impact of
M. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle Upon the NLRA., 66 GEO. L.J. 1109, 1115-16
(1978).
194. See supra note 111; see also e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19
(1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF
1935, at 3046, 3069 (1949); DuRoss, supra note 192, at 1116-17.
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misconduct.195 As the Court points out, section 10(c) governs standards of
proof for the establishment of any unfair labor practice, not just mixed
motive discharges.' 96 In fact, the legislative history discusses only which
party bears the burden of proving an unfair labor practice. It does not
address the issue of affirmative defenses to violations, nor does it define
how these defenses are to be established. 197 Thus, lower courts relied on
legislative history which was silent on this issue.
Transportation Management Corp. is a permissible interpretation of con-
gressional intent underlying section 10(c) in its provision for a means by
which an employer may avoid the penalty of a section 8(a)(3) violation:
demonstrating legitimate and sufficient business cause for its actions. This
holding recognizes and balances the legitimate but competing interests of
an employer's right to fire unworthy employees and an employee's right to
engage in protected union activities. 19  In so doing, the Court adequately
addressed the legitimate concerns of courts rejecting Wright Line 1, 199 that
the Board avoid sustaining unmeritorious claims.
In a section 8(a)(3) unfair labor practice complaint, the NLRB does not
"weigh the various motives once it has been established that the em-
ployer's decision was tainted by animus.' '2°° Instead, the Board finds a
violation if by a preponderance of the evidence the discharge was in any
way motivated by antiunion bias. The Board's policy reflects the belief
that "union activities, even if only the 'straw that broke the camel's back'
should not deny employment to even a marginal employee." '' Thus, the
195. See supra note 111.
196. See supra note 181.
197. Id.
198. Accord Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1978) (Thornberry,
J., concurring). Judge Thornberry stated:
[C]ompeting interests exist in the labor setting, but there Congress has already es-
tablished a balance by passing the labor laws. That balance favors the employee,
for Congress clearly recognized the superior bargaining position of the em-
ployer. . . . The 'but for' standard significantly restrikes this balance in favor of
the employer, and such a test is contrary to Congressional policy ....
Id at 1265. But see Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61
HARV. L. REV. 1, 22 (1947) (section 8(a)(3) analysis should apply the "but for" test to bring
about closer scrutiny of the Board's findings on appeal and avoid erroneous reinstatement
orders); Note, supra note 8, at 341.
199. See, e.g., supra, text accompanying note 107.
200. See Truesdale, supra note 67, at 132.
201. Id. Truesdale explains that:
Implicit in the 'in part' concept is the conclusion that the employee's work-related
difficulties and his union activities were both factors considered by the employer in
deciding the appropriate discipline to be imposed, and that neither can be said to
have been a sufficient cause for the discipline.
Id (emphasis in original).
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Board in administering the legislative intent of the N.L.R.A. has created a
presumption in favor of employee protection. Requiring the General
Counsel to prove the absence of an affirmative defense would destroy that
presumption and improperly tilt the balance toward the employer 20 2 in
contravention of established statutory labor policy. The Court's holding
instead provides an impetus for both employers and employees to scruti-
nize carefully their actions in the workplace.2 °3
Other important policy considerations underlie the holding of Transpor-
tation Management Corp. Allocating the burden of proof to the employer
to demonstrate an affirmative defense comports with principles of fair-
ness.2 ' A requirement that the General Counsel prove an absence of le-
gitimate cause would both add an element to the prima facie case not
contemplated by section 10 of the N.L.R.A., and require the General
Counsel to prove facts about which the employer has superior
knowledge.2 °5
Finally, the Supreme Court exercised judicial deference to the Board's
interpretation of legislative intent, consistent with sound principles of judi-
cial review. 206 Agencies charged with implementing complex legislative
schemes, such as the N.L.R.A., are generally considered competent arbi-
ters of disputes concerning their mandate.207
202. See Comment, The Motivation Requirement in Single Employee Discharge Cases, 11
Loy. U. CI. L.J. 501, 511-12 (1980). This author criticizes the "but for" analysis advocated
by the First Circuit as destroying the N.L.R.A.'s presumption in favor of employee rights.
The author states, "[u]nder the First Circuit's approach, if a legitimate reason for firing the
employee exists apart from any antiunion motivation, the discharge does not violate the Act.
Therefore, where an employer is found to have mixed motives for the discharge, he is pre-
sumed to have acted for a legitimate reason." See also Note, supra note 25, at 240.
203. See Brodin, supra note 64, at 318.
204. See Belton, supra note 30, at 1218 ("Considerations of fairness ... are concerned
with the possibility that evidence on a particular element may lie more within the knowledge
or control of one party than another. A court's concern for fairness may lead it to allocate
the burdens on that question to the more knowledgeable party." (citation omitted)).
205. Accord NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967) (proof of motiva-
tion is most accessible to the employer); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486, at 290 (Chad-
bourne rev. ed. 1981) (plaintiff does not carry burden of persuasion when defendant has
superior access to evidence).
206. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979) ("Since Congress has
assigned to the NLRB the primary task of marking out the scope of the statutory language
. . . the NLRB has special expertise . . . . The NLRB's judgment is subject to judicial
review, but if its construction of the statute is reasonably defensible, it should not be rejected
. ... ); NLRB v. International Harvester Co., 618 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The
Board's order will be enforced if the Board correctly applied the law and if the Board's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.").
207. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 441 U.S. at 495 (The Board's "judgment as to what is a
mandatory bargaining subject is entitled to considerable deference.").
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III. CONCLUSION
In recognizing the "burden" cast upon an employer as an affirmative
defense, the court has quieted the debate over whether the N.L.R.A. per-
mits shifting the burden of persuasion to an employer. As even the lower
courts rejecting Wright Line noted, the burden of persuasion remains at all
times with the General Counsel under section 10(c).20 Under the
Supreme Court's analysis, if, after the General Counsel establishes the
prima facie case by a preponderance of evidence, the employer's evidence
fails to show that the employee would have been disciplined regardless of
union activities, the court must find against the employer.2 °9 Conse-
quently, the burden of persuasion has not shifted because the prima facie
elements have already been established by the NLRB General Counsel.
210
Rather, the employer is charged with establishing an affirmative defense.
What the lower courts had claimed was a shifting of the burden of persua-
sion was in fact confusion regarding the prima facie elements of a section
8(a)(3) violation and the Board's terminology used in Wright Line. The
courts misinterpreted the Wright Line test as requiring proof of "but for"
causation to establish a prima facie case, refusing to accept the Board's
established "in-part" test in analyzing mixed-motive section 8(a)(3)
charges.
Transportation Management Corp. reaffirmed the NLRB's long-standing
interpretation of section 8(a)(3) and section 10 of the N.L.R.A., which pro-
vides substantially more protection for employee rights than does the
methodology advocated by the First Circuit. The presumption in favor of
employee rights is explicit in the legislative history of the N.L.R.A. and is
reflected in NLRB decisions since passage of the Act. The Court endorsed
the Board's interpretation of national labor policy and rejected an ap-
proach that would have markedly tipped the balance in favor of the em-
ployer. Significantly, however, it also recognized that the Board's Wright
Line analysis reflects the legitimate but competing interest of the employer
in firing employees for cause to maintain an efficient work force. By al-
lowing the employer to establish an affirmative defense unrelated to the
prima facie elements, the Court has maintained the balance created by
Congress and endorsed the national labor policy goals set forth in the
N.L.R.A.
Joanne S. Marchetta
208. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
209. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. at 2474. See supra note 151.
210. See Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. at 2474-75. The argument that the
burden of persuasion shifts is only apposite if, as the courts rejecting Wright Line I held, the
prima facie case includes two elements, both antiunion animus and "but for" causation.
The Court, however, rejected this approach. 103 S. Ct. at 2474. See supra notes 166-72 and
accompanying text.
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